By Hank
Dittmar
Surface
Transportation
Policy Project
Originally presented
at RailVolution,
Portland, Oregon on
September 17, 1995
| | In May of 1995, the Federal Transit Administration reported to
Congress that seventy five projects were in some phase of the federal
process for fixed guideway funding under Section 3 of the Federal
Transit Act. This list is by no means complete, as it does not include
projects slated only for state and local funding or regular formula
funding. And the list includes many projects no longer being actively
pursued. Nonetheless, it is clear that many (one is tempted to say
most) metropolitan areas are considering some form of rail transit
project at this time. This huge demand for rail is not met by
discretionary federal funding under Section 3 New Starts, which has
not grown commensurate with demand. That federal funding for rail
has not kept pace with the interest in building it may be due to two
factors -- an attempt by the FTA in the Eighties to kill the program
which resulted in a report called the Pickrell Report; and the
subsequent effort funded partly by the Highway User Federation to
send economists and other rail opponents around the country to
exploit the Pickrell Report's findings. Every city proposing a rail
alternatives analysis has had to deal with these speakers, all of
whom cite the FTA report and all of whom conclude that rail transit
investment is not justified. Is there a response to the criticisms levied against transit by these
evangelistic naysayers? Can or should every city try to respond to the
criticisms of overblown promises, out of control costs and
unrealized benefits? I'd like to propose a strategy for seeing that
fixed guideway alternatives get a fair shake in the analysis process
and a fair hearing in the debate. The Surface Transportation Policy
Project has been looking at rail systems around the country to see
what common factors enable them to succeed. What I'd like to do
today is define some of these factors, list rail's potential benefits, and
hopefully begin to provide a framework for deciding if the rail
investment is right for a community.
Asking the Wrong Questions
When rail detractors come to a city, they are drawn not only by their
speaking fees, but also by their conviction that rail transit needs to be
sacrificed on the altar of cost-effectiveness measured in the most
narrow terms. In most cases they use the 1990 FTA report authored
by Dr. Pickrell as the basis for their conclusion that rail transit
doesn't work anywhere. In fact the original FTA report proves
nothing of the kind. In it, Dr. Pickrell reviewed forecasting and
estimating in the early stages of planning for ten rail projects around
the country and compared these early numbers with construction
costs and ridership a few years after the systems were opened. The
explicit objective of the report was to make recommendations on
forecasting and planning techniques to improve the federal funding
and selection process -- not to evaluate whether rail works or not.
However the figures cited in the report have been used by a host of
people, mainly economists, to build cases against rail. I won't
attempt to go into the lively debates about the report's methodology
(if you want to read the critiques one has been authored by Jesse
Simon of Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority and
another by the American Public Transit Association), because it is
easy to get trapped on the slippery slopes of data analysis. The rail
detractors are simply proposing a biased and wrongheaded
analytical framework for evaluating rail's costs and benefits. Another
framework needs to be proposed.
These are the questions asked by the FTA report and used to build
the case by the many who have followed it.
1. Were planning estimates of construction cost accurate? And by
implication, if they were not, did rail proponents seek to mislead the
public? The FTA report looked at cost estimates in the planning
phase, not in the preliminary engineering phase of the project and
found that costs were underestimated. As any one used to the
construction process know, this is typical of big projects --
environmental problems and mitigation, construction setbacks and
the like all contribute to costs growing as projects get designed. This
problem is not unique to the transit industry -- the Interstate System
had to go through a triennial process of revising the cost estimate
upward. In 1990, the voters of California had to approve a gas tax
increase in large part to provide $3.5 billion in funds to pay for the
increase in the cost estimate of highway projects approved in 1988.
Clearly, we can't evaluate a technology on the basis of early
estimates. Wrong question!
2. Were early estimates of ridership accurate? The FTA report
looked at early ridership forecasts, not the forecasts used to execute
federal grants, and found that the systems studied had not achieved
future ridership forecast soon after opening. In one case the report
compared estimated ridership in 1988 with projected ridership in the
year 2000. Beyond the obvious problem of comparing apples to
oranges, rail is a long term investment and the ridership trends may
develop over a longer time frame. It took the BART system far
longer than projected to achieve its ridership goals, but it did and
now it exceeds them every day. Again looking at the Interstate, it is
doubtful whether many elements of the rural Interstate have ever
developed the traffic necessary to justify a four lane arterial, let
alone a four lane divided freeway. But that's not why we built the
Interstate: we built it as an economic development tool and rural
states will argue long and hard for their Interstate and National
Highway System mileage. In fact a recent study of the proposed
National Highway System high priority corridors by the University
of North Carolina found that none of them were justified by intercity
travel projections. We build transportation facilities to accomplish
many objectives, not all of which are measured by seeing whether
early ridership estimates are accurate. Again, wrong question!
3. Third, the report looked at operating costs and asked whether
system wide operating costs had declined as a result of the rail
investment. This criterion presumes that the only reason to make a
rail investment is to achieve some efficiency of scale, rather than to
achieve a higher level or quality of service, or achieve economic
development or congestion relief goals. It also presumed that the new
rail systems were in some way an application of rail technologies in
places where they didn't fit -- that new rail cities were less efficient
places to employ rail than older cities where rail could be made to
work. Our review of newer rail systems showed that operating
subsidies per passenger for newer rail systems compare favorably
with transit in general and with transit in older, more traditional rail
cities. In fact, newer light rail systems in San Diego, Portland and
Sacramento operate at a cost per passenger mile below or at the
national average of all light rail systems -- the San Diego Trolley
operates at half the national average. The newer urban heavy rail
systems in the San Francisco Bay Area and the Washington, DC area
similarly operate below the national average in cost per passenger
mile. Clearly its not true that the new systems are less effective than
old rail systems. Wrong question again!
Many rail opponents argue new rail systems are less effective than
bus systems. In fact a national comparison reveals that the cost per
passenger mile of both light and heavy rail systems opened is lower
than the national average of all bus and rail transit, with the single
exception of the Los Angeles system, which has extraordinarily high
security costs. Wrong again!
Rail opponents use these three arguments to point the way to a
conclusion: because not as many people ride rail as planners say, it
costs more to build and it costs more to operate than originally
planned. Therefore, say the opponents, let's stick with the status quo.
Asking the Right Questions
Rail transit is part of an overall development and accessibility
strategy for your community. The questions Pickrell asks are only the
right questions if local leaders are pursuing rail transit as a
stand-alone alternative to delivering mobility in a specific corridor.
This is rarely the case. Instead leaders pursue rail development for a
host of reasons including overall regional growth management,
promoting growth and development in specific areas of the
community, supporting overall accessibility goals on a system wide
basis, meeting environmental and quality of life objectives and
seeking to relieve congestion or accommodate future growth in auto
traffic. Rail should be pursued in an integrated fashion, in concert
with a host of other activities. Its success needs to be evaluated in
terms of this diverse set of benefits. Secondly, as economist David
Lewis has noted in his report Unsticking Traffic: When Transit
Works and Why :"Although mass transit systems present clear
evidence of driving up population densities and thereby reducing
travel access times, such changes occur over many years, even
decades. Thus new investments in transit must be nurtured and
sustained over many years. . ." Rail is a long term investment, and
evaluating it at three years of age or even five years of age is like
judging a human infant at that age -- it is mostly potential. The real
impact of rail transit needs to be looked at over the long term -- as a
fifty year investment.
These are some of the right questions to ask as you are considering
rail transit investment in your community:
- Is rail transit being pursued as part of a comprehensive strategy
for accessibility and mobility? Will it provide competitive
travel times in a congested corridor, or provide capacity in a
corridor where additional highway capacity is constrained? Is
the rail link being integrated into the existing transit and
paratransit service in a comprehensive way -- operations,
service and fares? Are the needs of pedestrians for system
access being balanced by those who drive to the stations? Rail
transit can provide a competitive alternative to the automobile
and in some corridors a lifeline alternative to the auto --
witness the BART system in the 1989 earthquake in the San
Francisco Bay Area. If properly integrated with bus service,
fixed guideway systems can improve overall performance and
reduce travel times for transit users. And if properly planned,
rail service can relieve highway congestion, providing for
overall increases in people carried in congested corridors.
- Is rail investment being pursued as part of an integrated land use
and growth management plan for the region? Are local leaders
willing to direct future growth to the vicinity of the rail system
by changing zoning to allow additional density and by
protecting open space in areas not served by rail? Are
communities developing station area specific plans which
integrate mixed use development, including housing in the
vicinity of the rail system? Are pedestrian and bicycle
accessways a key part of the plan? Child care facilities?
Service retail, including convenience stores and cleaners? Are
government agencies willing to commit themselves to building
their facilities, both those with substantial numbers of
employees and those serving the public, within walking
distance of the rail system?
- Is the rail corridor one which has significant levels of existing
demand? Does it support or maintain existing centers of
activity, such as traditional downtowns, special event sites or
nodes of development? Is the technology proposed appropriate
to travel characteristics in the corridor?
- Does the community support the system? Do business leaders
support the system? Are voters and elected officials willing to
commit local funds to build the system? Is rail transit part of an
overall environmental strategy for the region? Have
communities been involved in planning station areas?
- Will the proposed system increase overall and individual
access to jobs, services, opportunities and markets? Is this
enhanced access serving the transit dependent population as
well as so-called choice riders? Is rail complementary to bus
service, or does it replace bus service? Is rail access being
provided to communities of color and low income
communities? Have they been involved in the decision making
process?
Each community must ask these kinds of long range questions of
itself. Rail transit is a major investment and it won't be a successful
investment if it is not pursued in a comprehensive way. Making rail
transit work requires sustained commitment, both on the
transportation side and the land use and development side. If each
community asks itself these kinds of questions and acts on the
answers appropriate to itself, then rail transit can be a key part of
building a vital, sustainable metropolitan economy. Fortunately, the
Federal Transit Administration is beginning to move in this direction
-- land use and environmental considerations have been added to the
federal criteria. The Pickrell report has resulted in better planning
and forecasting. And we are building the sustained support base
which leads to both doing a better job and increasing overall funding
levels to meet the demand. The two go hand in hand.
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